Friday, April 22, 2011

Eligibility for 2009 DLRA Resentencing Expanded and Clarified by Amendment to CPL § 440.46

The most recent New York State Budget Bill was signed into law on March 31, 2011.  This law effectively merges the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and the Department of Parole into one agency called the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (also referred to as the “Department”).  In addition to the merger, the bill amended CPL § 440.46 and in doing so expanded and clarified the scope of those eligible for resentencing.  The amendment became effective immediately, and can be found at L 2011, Ch. 62, Part C, Subpart B, § 79.  The law now reads as follows: 

“Any person in the custody of the department of [correctional services] CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION convicted of a class B felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law which was committed prior to January thirteenth, two thousand five, who is serving an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of more than three years, may, except as provided in subdivision five of this section, upon notice to the appropriate district attorney, apply to be resentenced to a determinate sentence in accordance with sections 60.04 and 70.70 of the penal law in the court which imposed the sentence.”

When the amendment to CPL § 440.60 is read in conjunction with the amendment to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(b), it is clear that the amendments intend for those under community supervision to be considered in the custody of this new Department and eligible for resentencing.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(b) reads as follows:

“Persons presumptively released, paroled, conditionally released or released to post-release supervision from an institution under the jurisdiction of the department [of correctional services or], the department of mental hygiene or THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES shall, while on presumptive release, parole, conditional release or post-release supervision be in the legal custody of the DEPARTMENT until expiration of the maximum term or period of sentence, or expiration of the period of supervision, including any period of post release supervision, or return to imprisonment in the custody of the department, as the case may be.

The amendment is meaningful and the broader impact of CPL 440.46 is consistent with the overall theme of this section of the legislation.  Any argument that this merger was only for financial reasons is quelled by the legislative intent portion of the bill.  The legislative intent focuses on promoting successful and productive reentry and reintegration for both incarcerated individuals and individuals under community supervision. 
 
“In view of the commonality of purpose governing the fundamental missions of both agencies, a single new state agency should be created to oversee the combined responsibilities of both and, in effect, provide for a seamless network for the care, custody, treatment and supervision of a person from the day of sentence of state imprisonment commences, until the day such person is discharged from supervision in the community.” 

The amendment of CPL 440.64 impacts the eligibility of two categories of defendants.  The first group is those who filed for resentencing while still incarcerated, but were released to parole before resentencing occurred.  The amendment clarifies and confirms that these individuals are covered by the statute since they are now clearly in the custody of the newly created Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, even after their release onto parole (now “community supervision”).  The same is true for defendants who file for resentencing after being released from prison and placed on parole.

Furthermore, the amendment to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(b) clarifies the custodial status of those defendants who have been reincarcerated following a parole violation.  Some courts have reasoned that parole violators returned to prison were not in the custody of DOCS, and therefore not eligible for resentencing under 440.46.  That argument now falls by the wayside as this amendment rejects such reasoning.  Parole violators who are reincarcerated are now clearly in the custody of the new joint Department. 

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5/4/11 UPDATE:   Although Westlaw has not yet updated CPL 440.46, there is a red flag that directs you to budget bill where the changes can be seen.  The statute has however been updated on the New York Assembly's website and can be found at the following link: New York CPL 440.46.

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Defendants Should be Thoroughly Prepared for their Alcohol and Substance Abuse Evaluation

An eligible defendant desirous of being considered for judicial diversion triggers that consideration by making a request for an alcohol and substance abuse evaluation to a Superior Court Judge.  Pursuant to CPL §216.05(1) the case should then be referred to either the Superior Court for drug treatment or any other part in Superior Court designated as a Drug Treatment Court by the Administrative Judge for judicial diversion (See New York Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge, § 143.2(c)).  In order for the evaluation to be prepared, the defendant will be interviewed by a court approved entity or licensed health care professional experienced in alcohol and substance abuse treatment, or an OASAS credentialed counselor.  The report generated as a result of this interview is an important factor in determining whether a defendant will be offered the option of judicial diversion. 

Recent decisions have highlighted the fact that inconsistent statements made by a defendant can substantially harm his or her chances of being approved.  In People v. Hombach, ___ N.Y.S.2d ___, 2011 WL 1136549 (N.Y.Co.Ct.), 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21112, the court specifically noted that,

“In reviewing the alcohol and substance abuse evaluation the defendant’s answers are inconsistent.”

The court went on to point out that the defendant desired no treatment according to one form he filled out, yet orally indicated that he was tired of using drugs and wanted to change, but could not do so on his own.  This was one factor used by the Court to deny this defendant’s request for judicial diversion. 

Inconsistencies drawn out during the alcohol and substance abuse evaluation were also pointed out by the court in People v. Jordan, 28 Misc.3d 708, 902 N.Y.S.2d 336. 

“Ms. Cardona told the Court that the defendant said he had not used cocaine or drank alcohol since July 2009.  This information is not contained in the report, but it contradicts at least in part a statement attributed to the defendant in that report indicating ‘he was using alcohol and drugs at the time of the current offense.’”

While these types of inconsistencies cannot be avoided altogether, proper preparation prior to the interview can minimize these instances.  This is certainly not to suggest that defense counsel tell their clients to lie.  On the contrary, counsel should instruct their clients to be forthright and honest.  Many inconsistencies are the result of confusion or simple error by the defendant.  The cases suggest however that this type of error can prove quite costly.  Counsel should provide defendants with a general idea of what types of questions they can expect to be asked including questions regarding the timing and duration of alcohol and drug use, and prior treatment received.  This will allow defendants to get their facts straight before they are questioned by the evaluator.  Additionally, defendants should be educated regarding the issues that the Judge will consider when deciding whether or not to offer them judicial diversion.  Through their responses at the evaluation, defendants arguably have the ability to impact the Judge’s decision regarding three of the five issues discussed in CPL § 216.05(3)(b).  As such, defendants should be made aware that they will only be offered judicial diversion if the judge finds the following:

1.  The defendant has a history of alcohol or substance abuse or dependence;

2.  such alcohol or substance abuse or dependence is a contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior; and

3.  the defendant’s participation in judicial diversion could effectively address such abuse or dependence.

Defendants should be encouraged to not only admit but thoroughly discuss their problems with alcohol and substance abuse, and the negative impact these problems have had on their lives including how it has led to criminal behavior.  They must also demonstrate the desire and determination to address those problems in the hope that this will empower them to avoid future criminal activity. 

Another way for defense counsel to ensure the best possible alcohol and substance abuse evaluation for their clients is to first discuss with them the pros and cons of judicial diversion.  This discussion should remove any ambivalence the defendant may have about seeking judicial diversion.  It is this ambivalent or lesser committed defendant who is often screened out.  While the pros are more obvious, the cons are sometimes overlooked.  The benefits of judicial diversion for defendants include the avoidance of jail or prison, potential record sealing, and perhaps most importantly, the opportunity to properly address their alcohol or substance abuse problem so that they may lead a healthy and law abiding life.  Defendants must also consider the potential consequences if they fail to complete the program.  When this happens, many courts are sentencing defendants to a harsher sentence than otherwise available under a plea deal, effectively punishing defendants for trying treatment, but failing.  As such, entering into judicial diversion will result is a much longer prison sentence hanging over a defendant’s head.  Furthermore, defendants also must be aware of the time commitment required to complete the program.  This will have to be balanced with any other commitments that they may have including employment.  Judges look favorably upon defendants who understand the program and display confidence that they can fulfill their obligations and succeed.  

Monday, March 21, 2011

Second Department Finds Parole Violators Are Eligible for Resentencing Under the 2009 DLRA

In People v. Phillips, __ A.D.3d __, 2011 NY Slip Op 02038, decided last week, the Second Department held that a parole violator who is reincarcerated on a parole violation for a class B drug offense, and who otherwise meets the eligibility criteria for resentencing set out in CPL § 440.46, is eligible to apply for resentencing.  The Second Department reasoned that:

                        “…[n]othing in CPL 440.46 supports a conclusion that such
                        status (as a parole violator) renders a person ineligible to
                        apply for resentencing in the first instance.”

In Phillips the Second Department soundly rejected the conclusion of the Appellate Division, First Department, in People v. Pratts, 74 A.D.3d 536, 537, lv granted 15 N.Y.3d 895, and in People v. Paulin, 74 A.D.3d 685, lv granted 15 N.Y.3d 854.  In Pratts and Paulin the First Department engrafted the specific eligibility requirement of the 2005 DLRA onto the 2009 DLRA, which had the effect of making parole violators ineligible for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA (which applies to A-II drug offenses) by limiting eligibility for resentencing to only those individuals who were more than three years from parole eligibility. (Obviously a parole violator could never be more than three years from his next parole board appearance because of the limit of a two year hit from board to board).   The Second Department made short work of this fiction, refusing to engage in a so-called interpretation of legislative intent of the plain meaning of CPL § 440.46.  Clearly this would be needlessly using “legislative intent” as an excuse to legislate.

                        “We do not agree with the conclusion of the Appellate
                        Division, First Department, that interpreting the statute
                        to permit parole violators to apply for resentencing would
                        be “contrary to the dictates of reason and leads to
unreasonable results.”
           
The key to the Phillips analysis is the Court’s ability to read and distinguish the language authorizing a motion for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA from the separate and distinct language of the 2009 DLRA.  It was this recognition that eligibility for resentencing for a class A-II drug offense is not the same as the eligibility criteria found in CPL 440.46 for a class B offense that formed the basis for the decision in Phillips.

One might say that the Second Department took the First Department to school on this one.

This issue is pending a decision in the Fourth Department in People v. Wallace.  The final word will come from the “headmaster” when the Court of Appeals hears Pratts and Paulin on appeal in late spring.  That decision will let us know if school is out.

Thursday, March 10, 2011

Second and Fourth Departments Adopt the First Department’s Interpretation of the Ten Year “Look Back” in CPL § 440.046


On February 11, 2011 we posted a new decision alert for the First Department case of People v. Sosa,  ___ A.D.3d ___, 916 N.Y.S 72 which was the first Appellate Division to rule on the interpretation of CPL 440.46’s ten year “look back” to determine whether a prior felony would be an exclusion offense so as to preclude a motion for resentencing.  As you may recall, the First Department adopted the defendant’s interpretation, an interpretation that we had suggested was the proper one dating back to the enactment of this statute.

Now the Second Department in People v. Williams (2011 WL 747920) and the Fourth Department in People v. Hill (2011 WL 589646) have joined the First Department, concluding that the proper interpretation of the ten year “look back” requires that it be measured from the date of the motion for resentencing and not, as the prosecution has contended in cases around the state, from the date of the commission of the felony for which the defendant seeks resentencing.  In Hill the Fourth Department soundly rejected the prosecution’s proposed interpretation of the statute, concluding:

            “…the People’s suggested interpretation is wholly at odds
            with the wording of the statute and would require us to rewrite
            the statute.  This we cannot do.”

Although this issue would now seem to be settled, with even Peter Preiser abandoning the prosecutor’s suggested interpretation in his Practice Commentary, the prosecution continues to pursue its soundly rejected interpretation as it seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in Sosa.  In light of the fact that there is a consensus among the three Appellate Divisions that have considered this issue, we are hopeful that the Court of Appeals will deny leave.

Friday, February 25, 2011

CPL Article 216 Judicial Diversion Implementation Hampered by an Inability to Transfer Interim Probation Supervision

CPL Article 216 created Judicial Diversion, an initiative intended to give judges wide discretion over which substance addicted defendants should be offered the opportunity for treatment instead of incarceration.  Judges were also empowered to create a specific treatment plan for Diversion participants, including the option of requiring defendants to appear in court at any time to monitor progress in treatment.  The Diversion Court “shall retain jurisdiction of the defendant” during the period of the defendant’s participation in Diversion.  See CPL §216.05(8)

When Judicial Diversion was created, the legislature essentially handed the practical aspects of implementation over to the Unified Court System.  Court Administrative Rules were promulgated, effectively shunting Judicial Diversion cases into existing Drug Treatment Courts in many counties and creating Judicial Diversion parts in other counties.  Significantly, many existing Drug Treatment Courts, and some Diversion Courts rely heavily upon interim probation supervision to monitor their participants, although not required to do so.

CPL §390.30(6) sets out the mechanics and limitations of interim probation.  There is no explicit provision to transfer interim probation supervision between counties, not even for the purpose of monitoring compliance with court ordered treatment.  Compare this with CPL §410.80 that authorizes the transfer of probation supervision and jurisdiction to the county of residence of the defendant.  It is interesting to note, however, that CPL§390.30(6) does not expressly prohibit interim probation transfers, either.  Thus it appears that it is a question of statutory interpretation and legislative intent as to whether a Diversion Court, or any other Court, could order interim probation supervision to be transferred to the county where the defendant resides.  The Office of Probation and Correctional Alternatives has interpreted these statutes to prohibit transfer of interim probation, and at least some Courts have joined in that interpretation.

As a result of this restrictive interpretation, a significant problem has arisen in Judicial Diversion cases.  Defendants are often charged with crimes in counties in which they do not reside.  Eligible and appropriate defendants who seek judicially sanctioned drug treatment frequently have only one option: the existing treatment court in the charging county, which they may enter via either Drug Treatment Court or Judicial Diversion.  Yet if the defendant lives outside the county of the Drug Treatment Court, some charging courts believe they cannot order transfer of interim probation supervision outside the county.  

It is also our understanding that Probation Departments are not willing or able to cross county lines to supervise interim probation defendants.  The end result is that some Judges are simply not comfortable allowing out of county defendants into treatment, even if they reside in a contiguous county, because they cannot presently be supervised by interim probation. This result undermines the legislative intent of both CPL Article 216 and the entirety of the 2009 DLRA.

We believe that there are ways around the total exclusion of appropriate Judicial Diversion candidates because of this glitch in interim probation.  As stated above, we believe that the statutes leave open the possibility that a court can order the transfer of interim probation supervision in the first instance, which would serve to eliminate this problem entirely.

Absent such an intrepid court order, a court may still order interim probation supervision for a defendant regardless of where the defendant resides.  CPL §390.30(6) states that where the court determines that a defendant is eligible for a probation sentence, after consultation with the prosecutor (note: not the agreement or consent of the prosecutor) and upon the consent of the defendant, the defendant may be placed on interim probation.  There is nothing in the statute that requires the defendant reside in the same county as the court making the interim probation order. 

The Office of Probation and Correctional Alternatives frowns upon the transfer of Interim Probation supervision to the county of residence because of specific statutory authority, however OPCA cannot prevent the Court from issuing the interim probation order, and arguably should not be able to ignore such an order.  The statute requires “The defendant’s record of compliance shall be included in the presentence report…and the court must consider such record and information when pronouncing sentence.” CPL §390.30(6)(a) (emphasis added).  It would seem difficult for Probation to completely ignore the Court’s order of interim probation and still remain compliant with the statute, regardless of the location of the defendant’s residence.  

If the court is inclined to seek a way to offer an eligible defendant treatment via Diversion and construct supervision conditions without interim probation supervision, there is ample authority for creating such conditions in CPL §216.05(5).  The court can mandate conditions of treatment and court reporting as it sees fit.  There is no reason the court could not enlist the assistance of services in the outside county for the purpose of supervision.  Local reentry programs, Pre-Trial Release agencies, Alternative to Incarceration (ATI) providers or local treatment entities in the outside county can give updates on the client’s status.  In addition, the defendant can be required to appear in court as directed or could be ordered to report to the probation department in the Court’s jurisdiction on a regular basis.  With creativity, there is no reason to exclude potential Diversion participants simply because supervision under interim probation may not be available. 

Regardless of these alternative solutions, this issue is in need of a legislative fix to give the court the option of interim probation supervision for out-of-county defendants where necessary and prudent.  We would like to hear from any advocates who have run into this unfortunate problem.  Please comment below or contact us directly with your information.

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Treatment Courts Should Enter Into Diversion Agreements That Cap the Potential Sentence.

CPL §216.05(5), (6), (8), (9)(c) and (10) all mention an “agreement” between the Court and the defendant.  This agreement can be on the record or in writing.  It shall include a specified period of treatment and MAY include periodic court appearances, urinalysis and a requirement to refrain from criminal behaviors.  The statute implies, but does not explicitly direct, that the agreement contain a description of what will occur if the defendant successfully completes Diversion or what sentence will be imposed if the defendant is unsuccessful in Diversion.   See CPL §216.05(9)(c): The Court must “when applicable proceed with the defendant’s sentencing in accordance with the agreement.”

Judges in some jurisdictions have taken the position that this language means the court need not cap the sentence for a Diversion participant.  These courts explicitly retain the right to sentence a participant to the “full range” or the “potential maximum” sentence if the defendant is terminated from Diversion and sentenced.

There are many reasons, both statutory and practical why Courts should include sentence caps in agreements:

A.  The language of the statute can be construed to strongly imply that there should be an agreement on sentence as well as on the conditions of participation in Diversion.  CPL §216.05(9)(c) refers to sentencing in “accordance with the agreement.”  Every other aspect of the statute regarding the agreement takes pains to give the Court options to tailor the terms of Diversion participation to the specific defendant based upon that individual defendant’s problems and needs of service.  There is every reason to believe that the legislature intended the Court to also individualize the sentence based upon the participant’s prior record, individual characteristics and the facts of the case before it.  Every case and every client is different.  The legislature encouraged Courts to make the specific Diversion plans, including the potential range of punishment, fit each individual client.

B.  There is much less incentive for potential participants to sign up for the challenge of Judicial Diversion if they face the potential maximum punishment for a failed attempt at treatment.  Generally in criminal cases defense counsel is able to negotiate a plea bargain that exchanges an admission of guilt for a sentence less than the maximum sentence, often much less.  Such a negotiated plea should provide a baseline for the client's sentencing exposure while participating in Diversion.  Many clients will be reluctant to participate in Diversion absent a negotiated cap.  Many defense lawyers will be reluctant to advise clients to participate in Diversion if the maximum sentence remains available to the treatment court simply because the client has opted to try treatment and failed. 

C.  Peter Preiser’s Commentary in McKinney’s CPL §216 indicates strong support for the idea of a sentence cap as part of the agreement to enter Diversion:

“And in consideration of the defendant’s agreement the court will make a commitment as to the ultimate disposition of the criminal charge if defendant abides by the conditions of the program and an alternative sentence if the defendant does not…”
           
            Preiser’s analysis of the statutory language clearly contemplates that the Court is obliged to articulate a certain sentence in consideration for the client agreeing to do the Diversion program.  Preiser also encourages that the conditions of this agreement be put in writing prior to any guilty plea.

D. There are studies that suggest defendants are more motivated by certainty of punishment rather than severity of punishment.  See “Deterrence in Criminal Justice-Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment” (November 2010 Sentencing Project Report summarizing research on the limited value of severe sentences.)  There is little evidence to support the position that an uncertain sentencing threat increases compliance with the Diversion agreement.  Caps on sentence, along with a system of supervision that creates a certainty of detection for violations, are more effective in gaining compliance with supervision.

E.  Some Diversion courts have agreements in which a specific cap is articulated, but the participant is informed on the record that if the client is arrested for a new offense while in Diversion, or if a bench warrant has to be issued for the person at any point, the cap on sentence is removed and the full range of sentence becomes available.  Although there is still a question about whether a failure in treatment warrants an enhanced sentence which is more than what the defendant would have received at the beginning of the case, at least in those jurisdictions the client is somewhat protected from the maximum sentence.

If such contracts are not being used in your jurisdiction, Counsel can produce their own written contract, and include a provision for a cap on sentence.  Even if rejected this could at least open discussions about such a cap.  A sample contract from Monroe County can be found on the CCA website here.

Friday, February 11, 2011

NEW DECISION ALERT!! First Department Decides CPL §440.46 Ten-Year Lookback Case!

Drug Law Reform advocates have been awaiting a definitive ruling regarding the 10-year lookback provision of CPL §440.46(5)(a) which serves to exclude from resentencing people “previously convicted within the preceding ten years” of certain felony offenses. 

The issue has been: to what time frame does that language refer?  Is it the time between the previous potential exclusion conviction and the commission of the drug offense for which resentencing is sought, or the longer and more inclusive time period from the previous potential exclusion conviction to the filing of the motion for resentence?  After tremendous work by Barbara Zolot and the Center for Appellate Litigation, the First Department has decided it is the latter.

In People v. Sosa, Judge Marcy J. Kahn held in strong and sweeping language that the 10 year lookback period “runs back from the date of the resentencing application, and not from the date of the drug offense upon which the defendant seeks resentencing.”

The Court held that the plain language of the statute supports such interpretation.

“While the People seek to interpret that provision to mean the 10 years preceding the commission of the present felony, that interpretation strains the plain meaning of the statute.  The provision uses the simple phrase ‘preceding 10 years’, without reference to the date of commission of the present felony.  By its plain meaning, it would mean the 10 years preceding the resentencing application, since no other time period is set forth.”

The Court also considered the ameliorative purpose of the statute, as well as the protection of the public from violent drug offenders.

“Measuring the lookback period from the date of the application would permit drug offenders with violent pasts to eventually become eligible as those pasts fade into history, rather than making them permanently ineligible.  This interpretation would also be consistent with the statute’s public safety concerns, since it would still exclude persons with recent violent backgrounds.”

For good measure the Court threw in that “…the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius also supports the court’s determination.” 

Take that.

This decision will allow many people who might have been precluded from arguing for resentencing to at least get their day in court.  Hopefully the other Departments of the Appellate Division will eventually follow suit.  But for now, People v. Sosa stands as the law of the land in New York on the CPL §440.46(5)(a) 10 year lookback provision. [See Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918(2nd Dept. 1984)]